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Magie Hogan
The Great Moral Tragedy
I Introduction
 According to John Dewey, “The separation of warm emotion 
and cool intelligence is the great moral tragedy,” (238).  For when it 
comes to morality, this “cool intelligence” is trusted to stand alone.  The 
legitimacy of reason is blindly respected in our society.  It is the language 
of leaders and a value that affects our conduct as individuals and as a 
whole.  The moral tragedy comes into play as hindsight reveals the failure 
of this approach to inspire ethical behavior.  In this paper, I will argue 
that when making decisions about intervention, sentiment ought to 
trump reason.  Unfortunately, sentiment-based decision making will not 
become the norm until current habituated dependencies on reason-based 
justifications are challenged.   Two historical events of the twentieth 
century will be used to show contradicting results of this imbalance.  
A wave of illogical action at the start of World War I, and a void of 
necessary action during the Rwandan genocide were results of decision 
makers valuing reason far above sentiment.  
II Progressive Sentiment over Ineffective Reason
 Though often overlooked, sentiment is overwhelmingly 
important in moral decision making.  David Hume wrote that “reason 
is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend 
to any other office than to serve and obey them” (167).  Hume identifies 
ways in which reason is inadequate for the job of moral activity.  Reason 
connects sentiments with logic, but does not have the ability to determine 
good from evil.  Furthermore, it is “morals [that] excite passion and 
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produce or prevent actions,” which leaves reason ineffective in the 
shadow of sentiment when dealing with intervention (p.170).  Thoughts 
motivated by sympathy move through a situation similarly to that of 
reason, though they produce more effective results.   Hume specifies that 
sympathy is a process that recognizes the cause and effect of emotions 
and thus produces sentiment which is the root of human motivation 
(175).  These three strengths of sentiment, being the ability to determine 
good from evil, produce action, and understand that action, are highly 
important in cases of war and genocide where so many decisions 
presented are decisions of morality. 
 Annette C. Baier refers to “the care perspective,” which is 
concerned with the good of others and thus holds the same responsibility 
and weight as Hume’s sympathy (445).  Both Baier and Hume are 
prescribing a more important role for emotion in our society.  Jonathan 
Glover, author of Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century,  
values sentiment, though less for its motivational qualities and more 
for it preventative ones.  He argues that sentiment is necessary to avoid 
Nietzsche’s version of ethics as self-creation which results in selfishness, 
dominance and a “festival of cruelty;” this proves to be insightful in the 
light of poorly made moral decisions (17).  He seems to respond to Baier 
with the stance- “My caring about the sort of person I am motivates the 
project of self-creation.  Why should not my caring about other people 
set limits to it?” (17).  Hume, Baier and Glover all hold “the others” as a 
moral focus.  When making ethical decisions it is sentiment, not reason, 
that is more effective as it takes “the others” into account.  
Reason as a Bad Habit
 Though sentiment-based decision making would be more 
valuable in the case of intervention, habituated dependencies to rely on 
reason continue to prevail.  According to John Dewey, “To change the 
working character or will of another we have to alter objective conditions 
which enter into his habits” (p.22).  The bad habit is reliance on reason, 
and through certain instances of intervention the halting qualities 
present when sentiment is absent become clear. Consider that from the 
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assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria on June 18 of 1914 
to the British Entry of the war on August 3 of the same year, the leaders 
of multiple countries reasoned themselves into a World War (Glover part 
4).  The way in which World War I started seems to have been a series of 
“if-then” ultimatums.  Austria-Hungary told Serbia that if they accepted 
an ultimatum to suppress propaganda, tighten boarder controls, and 
arrest certain groups and individuals, than they would not be invaded 
(179).  On July 29 Germany declared that if Russia mobilized, than they 
would mobilize as well.  Germany then sent an ultimatum to France 
stating that if they did not stay neutral, than they would be invaded.  The 
invasion took place on August 2, the same day that the ultimatum from 
Britain stating that Germany invading Belgium was grounds for war 
was broken.  These “if-then” statements are soaked in reason, leaving 
little room for sentiment to be noticed, with no chance of their being 
intellectualized for motivation.  Glover wrote of the countries involved 
“they misperceived each other and miscalculated each other’s responses 
– they were sleepwalking into war,” (185).  
 WWI was not an isolated incident.  Others can be identified 
where lack of focus on sentiment resulted in conflict.  One of these 
instances is the genocide that took place in Rwanda in the mid-1990’s.  
Hume creates for us a picture of “the judicious spectator,” which is the 
ability of us all to experience feelings of approval or disapproval when 
we reflect from a common point of view on the people affected by an 
action (178).  This should be a powerful way for those in leadership 
positions to make decisions that affect others.  However, there is a flaw 
in our current employment of the judicious spectator. Though there 
may be reflection from a common point of view regarding the people 
affected by an action, we are disregarding our own feelings of approval or 
disapproval (sympathy) that result from reflection.  It is because of this 
flaw in thought process that the situation in Rwanda was able to happen 
under the watch of the rest of the world.  In the midst of evacuation of 
non-Africans from Rwanda, intense hate propaganda, and public mass 
killings, Bill Clinton was able to address the people of America and the 
people of the world with the message that the United States would not 
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intervene in a humanitarian crisis void of interest for our own country 
(Barker).  It is clear that those responsible for making this decision were 
indeed reflecting on who would be affected from common point of view.  
It is also clear that in this reflection there was no true sentiment allowed 
to have an effect on the decision.  It was Hume who pointed out that 
sympathy can be used as aversion.  In Clinton’s speech he expressed a 
deep regret for the people involved, but if the sentiment was true, there 
would have been a motivation to act.  We didn’t even interfere with the 
radio broadcast messages telling Hutu that now was the time to slaughter 
their Tutsi neighbors (Barker).  Reason justified that this would have 
been a violation of the Constitution’s freedom of speech, regardless of 
the right to life which is still found in our constitution mid-genocide 
(Barker).  As I will demonstrate, sentiment would have told us that at 
this point any act of prevention, no matter how small, was completely 
worthwhile.  
 There were some who stayed in Rwanda and put this mentality 
to use.  Philippe Gaillard was the individual leading the Red Cross in 
Rwanda during the genocide.  From his position he experienced the 
massive amount of violence, and he experienced it quickly judging from 
the estimated 100,000 people killed in the first week alone.  When a Red 
Cross van was stopped by the extremists and the six wounded inside 
were killed, he was faced with the decision of whether or not to make the 
information public.  Despite the Red Cross dictum of neutrality through 
public service, and the danger he was putting himself in, he spoke of 
what he saw.  The publicity embarrassed the extremists and the Red 
Cross was granted safe passage throughout Rwanda.  Gaillard said that 
“in such circumstances if you don’t at least speak up, clearly, you are 
participating to the genocide. If you just shut up when you see what you 
see, and morally, ethically you can not shut up, it’s a responsibility to 
talk” (Barker).  Carl Wilkins, an Aid worker for the Adventist Church, 
protected an orphanage of children by simply speaking to the Prime 
Minister of Rwanda.  In reflection he later said, “In each one of us 
there is such a potential for good and such a potential for evil” (Barker 
2004).  These men and other individuals expressed their inability to 
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leave the situation without trying to help. They said they would feel 
wrong.  Moreover, and more importantly, they would feel responsible.  
Hume would describe these people as virtuous for “virtue is nothing 
but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation 
of a character,” (174).  There actions, which were fueled by sentiment- 
packed perspectives of the genocide, are even more heartbreaking next 
to episodes of apathy.  For on the other hand, Hume describes that 
one can have a general desire to achieve good and avoid evil without 
involving emotion (169).  Mix this reason based concept of good and evil, 
with empty words of sympathy, and the disassociating distance between 
America and Rwanda, and a disaster like genocide can pass unrestricted 
so completely by the people with so much power.    
How to Shake a Bad Habit
 John Dewey set out to describe an ethical program which was 
to use “the intelligent acknowledgement of the continuity of nature, 
man and society” to secure a morality free from the weight of ineffective 
habits (13).  These habits, once established, are not thought of as needing 
reevaluation.  As society changes drastically between generations; 
through wars, genocides, invasions, and revolutions, it is absolutely 
necessary to look at the habits that fuel values.  Dewey writes that 
“instead of constantly utilizing unused impulse to effect continuous 
reconstruction, we have waited till an accumulation of stresses suddenly 
breaks through the dikes of custom,” (96).  The build up of ineffective 
behavior leading to the release of effective action happens under 
some circumstances.  Unfortunately, the situation of how to deal with 
genocide-related issues has not yet reached this point.  Throughout 
history, an act of genocide leads to the general conclusion of “never 
again.”  However, our blind social forces seem to have created an 
“accidental morality” in which it is ethical and excusable for a present 
episode of genocide to be ignored (292).  In the case of war and genocide 
it would be in the best interest of humanity to take a proactive approach 
to replace ineffective behavior with habits that can make a positive 
difference.  
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 Sentiment and reason are both going to show up within people 
habitually.  The question becomes which of the two will be valued 
in human conduct?  Dewey describes this as a choice “between the 
development of a technique by which intelligence will become an 
intervening partner and a continuation of a regime of accident, waste 
and distress,” (254).  If sentiment becomes a habit of society it will be 
valued among its members.  Our values affect and are affected by our 
environment as well as our conduct.  Impulses and actions from our up 
to date experiences will act as informants and keep the system of nature, 
man, and society up-to-date with the reality of interaction. 
III Kant and Reason
 The sentiment-based philosophy of Hume was different than that 
advised by his immediate predecessors.  Let us, for example, consider 
how what I have said here stands up to the framework provided by 
Immanuel Kant.  Kant argues that the only way in which to establish 
moral rules is through reasoning (Kant, 2007).  If approached in this 
manner, morality will become indisputable and universalizable.  This 
perspective is a problem if it is to be incorporated into Dewey’s ethical 
program.  A moral truth that is expected to be universalizable is expected 
to apply to all people and appeal to human reason.  Without reflection 
over the success or failure of past activities when seeking moral truths, 
habituated, ineffective tendencies will become the norm.   Reason 
alone is a stagnant moral plan.  In the case of intervention, Kant would 
push decision makers to reason through the situation, and dismiss any 
emotion that may get in the way.  As it was made clear through World 
War I, reason can not stand on its own to produce a morality from a 
situation that makes sense.  In this case, reason resulted in the action of 
war before anyone involved had time to gain a feeling of the situation.  
Rwanda, however, was not about senseless action but rather a lack of 
activity caused by reason based holdups.  Kant may argue that emotions 
are too airy and subjective to hold any of the weight of moral decision 
making.  But judging from these historical events and more it would 
do humanity good not to leave reason-based decision-making habits in 
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place.
IV Conclusion
 Ethical dilemmas are very prominent in times of violent conflict.  
If sentiment is valued over reason in war and genocide-related matters, 
then the chance of the moral effects of a situation getting out of control 
is reduced.  There is intuition built into sympathy and sentiment.  Hume 
writes that “the moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition, 
or the insufficiency of any means our passions yield to your reason 
without any opposition,” (168).  We know this to be true.  If one desires 
something but is convinced of otherwise, they desire it no more.  Emotion 
is not stagnant; it responds intuitively to a situation as the situation 
changes with human conduct and environmental concerns.  Sentiment 
holds the flexibility needed to work with Dewey’s ethical program and, 
if habituated, will help change human behavior in a more productive 
direction.
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